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ABSTRACT 
 The United States invests significant time and resources in conducting drug 
interdiction operations in the Western Hemisphere. However, the primary strategic focus 
for the United States is great power competition (GPC) with Russia and China. GPC 
objectives are accomplished by maintaining or expanding influence, which can be 
achieved by becoming another nation’s partner of choice. Partnership requires 
understanding the priorities of other nations so that mutually beneficial policy can be 
developed. This thesis examines how drug interdiction operations support the United 
States’ strategic GPC objectives. By identifying the national priorities for Latin American 
partners and assessing the importance of counter-drug policy, this thesis concludes that 
drug interdiction operations have the potential to support the United States’ GPC 
objectives only if a partner nation places similar importance on counter-drug policy. As 
the regional hegemon, the United States must determine the risk of not becoming or not 
remaining the partner of choice in exchange for accomplishing U.S. policy goals without 
considering the priorities of partner nations. 
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1 
I. GREAT POWER COMPETITION AND DRUG 
INTERDICTION 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Between April and September 2020, an average of six Aegis destroyers conducted 
counter-narcotics operations at any one time in the United States Southern Command’s 
(SOUTHCOM) area of operations.1 Partnering with 22 other Latin American nations, the 
United States Coast Guard (USCG), supported by the U.S. Navy, apprehended nearly $2 
billion worth of cocaine by September.2 By comparison, nearly $6 billion worth of cocaine 
had been apprehended in 2018 with an average of only two naval warships operating in 
SOUTHCOM. The increased number of military assets in 2020 did not stop more drugs 
from crossing through Caribbean and eastern Pacific waters. 
In President Trump’s July 2020 briefing with SOUTHCOM leadership, he 
highlighted the importance of working with Latin American nations as a way of sharing 
responsibility for combatting drug trafficking and demonstrating the United States’ stance 
on illegal drugs.3 However, the U.S. National Security Strategy is oriented around great 
power competition (GPC) with China and Russia, while Latin America is mentioned only 
once in the strategy.4 
These facts beg the following questions: if more warships apprehended fewer drugs 
and national security priorities are focused on GPC, is an increased naval presence in 
 
1 Sam LaGrone, “Destroyers Continue to Prowl 4th Fleet as Coast Guard, Navy Rack Up $1B in Drug 
Seizures,” USNI News, July 2, 2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/07/02/destroyers-continue-to-prowl-4th-
fleet-as-coast-guard-navy-rack-up-1b-in-drug-seizures. 
2 Donald J. Trump, “Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug 
Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2021” (Official memorandum. Washington, DC: Department of State, 
2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-determination-major-drug-transit-
major-illicit-drug-producing-countries-fiscal-year-2021/. 
3 Donald J. Trump, “Remarks by President Trump in Briefing on SOUTHCOM Enhanced 
Counternarcotics Operations” (speech, Doral, FL, July 10, 2020), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/
briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-briefing-southcom-enhanced-counternarcotics-operations/. 
4 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: White 
House, 2017), 39, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-
2017-0905.pdf. 
2 
SOUTHCOM for drug interdiction the best way to accomplish national security priorities? 
If there are benefits to using the U.S. Navy for counternarcotics (CN) operations, and do 
they align with the GPC priorities outlined by the National Security Strategy? This thesis 
analyzes the benefits of conducting maritime drug operations with U.S. Navy assets and 
determine if these kinds of operations support the goals of GPC. It answers the key research 
question: Do drug interdiction operations in the Western Hemisphere support great power 
competition objectives and the greater national security strategy? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
As U.S. policy adjusts back toward GPC, national security concerns in Latin 
America are shifting from the war on drugs, which has been the primary national security 
concern in the region since the Cold War. The U.S. military and decision makers must 
evaluate emerging priorities against existing missions, including drug interdiction 
operations. Drug interdiction operations are conducted by joint U.S. military forces, law 
enforcement, and partner nations in Latin America, but the benefits of these cooperative 
efforts need to be assessed in the context of international relationships with Latin American 
partners, civil-military relations, and especially GPC.  
Great power competition focuses on China and Russia as rising powers, but regions 
like Latin America with many developing countries will become arenas of diplomatic, 
economic, and possibly military conflict as the United States attempts to maintain its 
influence against Chinese and Russian growth.5 During the Cold War, United States policy 
lacked an understanding of Latin American priorities, only seeing the region in reference 
to itself or the Soviet Union.6 U.S. policy makers should avoid the same approach and 
account for Latin American governments’ priorities in the way they attempt to manage 
Chinese and Russian influence in the Western Hemisphere. This thesis demonstrates the 
importance of considering Latin American priorities in developing United States strategy. 
 
5 Mark D. Miles and Charles R. Miller, “Global Risks and Opportunities: The Great Power 
Competition Paradigm,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 94 (2018): 81. 
6 Christopher Darnton, “Latin America” (presentation, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 
Summer 2020); and R. Evan Ellis, The Strategic Dimensions of Chinese Engagement with Latin America 
(Washington, DC: William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, 2013), 137. 
3 
Ultimately this thesis makes recommendations the use of military resources that enable the 
United States to maintain a positive influence in Latin America while being used efficiently 
for GPC.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In order to thoroughly analyze this question, I examine the academic research on 
GPC and drug trafficking operations in Latin America. GPC deals with the international 
system in reference to the United States, China, and Russia, and most other nations are 
considered in the light of how their policies impact the relative global power of these three 
states. The literature for drug trafficking in Latin America indicates that drug trafficking is 
not only a hemispheric problem, but also that there are objections to drug trafficking’s 
categorization as a security issue. This literature review provides a foundation for 
understanding the complex intersection between the interests of GPC and counter-drug 
trafficking operations. The debates within both topics about the use of resources will 
influence future policy decisions.  
1. Great Power Competition 
Great power competition is central to U.S. national security strategy.7 Most 
scholars and U.S. defense leaders argue that GPC focuses on the expansion and growth of 
China and Russia, who are both world powers seeking more influence. Sometimes North 
Korea and Iran are categorized as great powers, but authors concerned about North Korea 
and Iran consider them to be “rogue” powers and are better understood as regional actors.8 
In his posture statement to the House Armed Services Committee, General Kenneth 
McKenzie, Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), still made a point to 
mention China as a threat in his area of responsibility (AOR) after detailing the ways Iran 
 
7 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America. 
8 Patrick Porter, “Advice for a Dark Age: Managing Great Power Competition,” The Washington 
Quarterly 42, no. 1 (January 2019): 7, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2019.1590079; and Lauren A. 
Courchaine, Alexus G. Grynkewich, and Brian D. Courchaine, “Structuring for Competition: Rethinking 
the Area of Responsibility Concept for Great Power,” Joint Forces Quarterly 98 (September 2020): 5. 
4 
as a non-peer still threatens regional security and U.S. interests.9 By comparison, Admiral 
Phil Davidson only mentioned North Korea (DPRK) in his posture statement to state that 
a nuclear capable North Korea is the “most immediate threat”10 to U.S. interests in the 
region. North Korea’s power growth is centered on military power, and Iran’s priority is 
nuclear proliferation.11 Professor R. Evan Ellis is one of many who consider both states a 
real threat, but not on the level of China and Russia. According to Ellis, Russia and China 
are exploiting Cold War strategy by pursuing economic expansion and soft power growth 
to drive out American influence while building up their own military power.12 
In terms of military power, experts note that Russia has expanded territorially 
through military exercises and put pressure on other nations in the former Soviet bloc 
through cyber-attacks.13 Their naval operations in Sixth Fleet are increasingly aggressive 
and designed to create propaganda in which it appears American ships are failing to comply 
with accepted maritime rules. In global economic markets, Russia appears to be less 
 
9 Posture Statement of Commander, United States Central Command: Testimony before the House 
Armed Services Committee, 116th Cong. (2020) (statement of General Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., 
Commander, USCENTCOM). 
10 Posture Statement of Commander, United States Indo-Pacific Command: Testimony before the 
House Armed Services Committee, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Admiral Philip Davidson, 
Commander, USINDOPACCOM). 
11 Eugene Rumer, Russia in the Middle East: Jack of All Trades, Master of None (Washington, DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019), 18, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/31/russia-
in-middle-east-jack-of-all-trades-master-of-none-pub-80233; and Porter, “Advice for a Dark Age,” 8; and 
Anna Péczeli, “The Trump Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review: Back to Great Power Competition,” 
Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 1, no. 2 (October 2018): 241, https://doi.org/10.1080/
25751654.2018.1530741. 
12 R. Evan Ellis, “Understanding and Responding to Chinese Activities in Latin America and the 
Caribbean,” in China’s Global Influence: Perspectives and Recommendations, ed. Scott D. McDonald and 
Michael C. Burgoyne (Honolulu: Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2019), 152, 
https://apcss.org/chinasglobalinfluence/. 
13 Steven Pifer, “Crimea: Six Years After Illegal Annexation,” Order from Chaos (blog), March 17, 
2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/17/crimea-six-years-after-illegal-
annexation/; and Alison Lawlor Russell, Cyber Blockades (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 
2014), ch 4–5; and Jeffrey Larsen, “Principles of Russian Foreign Policy” (presentation, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, Summer 2020). 
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aggressive toward the United States while attempting to establish trade markets in Africa, 
the Middle East, and Eastern Europe.14 
Scholars and experts on China’s increasing capabilities detail its rapidly expanding 
military and international presence. China’s maritime tactics in Seventh Fleet are escort 
and surveillance because the primary focus is on territorial water disputes and developing 
a blue-water navy.15 China’s industrial base is rapidly building ships and updating 
technology in order to achieve this goal. China has been aggressive in domestic and global 
economic expansion with a long-term goal outlined in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).16 
China is also expanding its trade network in Latin America, Africa, and South East Asia, 
choosing to work with international organization where the United States is not involved 
like the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), instead of the 
Organization of American States (OAS).17 China is the predominant threat for those 
concerned with GPC. 
While there is general consensus that China and Russia are great powers and peer 
competitors with the United States in global markets and industry, not all scholars consider 
this competition a serious threat to American power or influence. From an economic 
standpoint, historians like Peter Smith argue that Russian and Chinese expansion and 
investment in developing nations have the potential to introduce or increase prosperity and 
 
14 Alexander Bratersky, “Sudan to Host Russian Military Base,” Defense News, November 13, 2020, 
https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2020/11/13/sudan-to-host-russian-military-base/; and 
Andrew S. Natsios, “Foreign Aid in an Era of Great Power Competition,” Prism: A Journal of the Center 
for Complex Operations 8, no. 4 (2020): 101–19. 
15 Timothy R. Heath, Kristen Gunness, and Cortez A. Cooper, The PLA and China’s Rejuvenation: 
National Security and Military Strategies, Deterrence Concepts, and Combat Capabilities, RR-1402-OSD 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016), 31–32, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1402.html. 
16 Rachel Sigman, “Africa” (presentation, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, Summer 2020); 
and Lindsey Ford et al., “What Would a Larger Chinese Presence Mean for the Middle East?,” ChinaFile 
(blog), August 20, 2019, https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/what-would-larger-chinese-presence-
mean-middle-east; and Darnton, “Latin America”; and R. Evan Ellis, “China’s Security Challenge to the 
United State in Latin American and the Caribbean,” in China, the United States, and the Future of Latin 
America, ed. Daniel Denoon (New York: New York University Press, 2017). 
17 Ellis, “China’s Security Challenge to the United State in Latin American and the Caribbean,” 353. 
6 
stability in states where one or both are absent.18 Increased state stability is one of the goals 
of all international organizations, according to this view, so it seems that American concern 
with Russian and Chinese influence is a neo-imperialist objection.19 
Another reason some scholars are not concerned with GPC is due to the 
improbability of the outbreak of a conventional war between the United States and China 
or Russia. First, the globalization of the developed world means great powers are members 
of the same international organizations.20 Second, great power economies are dependent 
on each other through supply chains and the global market.21 Finally, there is no popular 
or political desire to engage in conventional warfare, so conflict will most likely occur in 
cyberspace or, like during the Cold War, in developing states through proxies.22 Given 
these factors, experts across multiple disciplines do not anticipate GPC significantly 
impacting the international status quo. 
Like during the Cold War, nations tend to be grouped into categories; but instead 
of first, second, or third world designations, nations classified as a great power, a non-great 
power, or a developing nation. Great powers focus on developing states in order to increase 
influence, but a significant gap in GPC literature is to examine the impact of great power 
competition on non-great powers like India, Brazil, and South Africa who are not 
developing nations, but not great powers. Latin American scholars like Peter Smith predict 
that Latin America states (and some in Africa and the Middle East, too) will be caught 
between conflicting great powers and their need for international support to continue 
 
18 Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, the United States, and the World, 4th ed. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 283–90; and Richard L. Harris, “China’s Relations with the Latin 
American and Caribbean Countries: A Peaceful Panda Bear Instead of a Roaring Dragon,” Latin American 
Perspectives 42, no. 6 (2015): 153–90. 
19 Smith, Talons of the Eagle. 
20 Darnton, “Latin America”; and Ellis, “Understanding and Responding to Chinese Activities in Latin 
America and the Caribbean.” 
21 Harris, “China’s Relations with the Latin American and Caribbean Countries”; and Darnton, “Latin 
America.” 
22 Ford et al., “What Would a Larger Chinese Presence Mean for the Middle East?”; and Miles and 
Miller, “Global Risks and Opportunities”; and R. Evan Ellis, “America’s Strategy for Latin America and 
the Caribbean,” Air Space Power Journal - Africa and Francophonie 8, no. 2 (Summer 2017): 10–32. 
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developing.23 According to economist Richard Harris, the scholars who interpret all 
international activity through a GPC lens falsely assume that these regions have the same 
concerns as the United States about China and Russia.24 For instance, Harris points out 
that Latin America and Caribbean nations benefitted from Chinese investment in 2015 and 
would likely to continue from increased foreign direct investment (FDI). For these 
countries, Chinese influence is a secondary concern to socio-economic stability made 
possible by investment.25 While developing nations are more likely to feel the impact of 
tensions between great powers, the literature does not discuss how non-great powers might 
respond to those increased tensions.  
As the discussion and implementation of GPC strategies in military operations 
continues, aligning resources to meet GPC goals will influence which missions and 
commands receive attention and funding. As previously observed, Geographic Combatant 
Commanders (GCC) recognize the preeminence of the threat from Russia and China, but 
these leaders are required to focus on closer geographic threats like Iran for CENTCOM or 
drug trafficking for SOUTHCOM. R. Evan Ellis argues that the diversification of missions 
within each geographic region may be a better approach to maintaining American influence 
in regions where Russian and Chinese presence is increasing because an indirect result of 
relationship building is the consolidation of American influence.26 Alternatively stated, 
commands like SOUTHCOM have operations in place designed to strengthen partner 
nations which allows the United States to become the partner of choice, diminishing the 
appeal of Russian or Chinese investments. Ellis reasons that not all missions need to have 
a direct alignment with the goals of GPC in order to accomplish its goals. Using this lens, 
this thesis will examine if and how drug interdiction operations in Latin America support 
GPC strategy. 
 
23 Smith, Talons of the Eagle. 
24 Harris, “China’s Relations with the Latin American and Caribbean Countries”; and Smith, Talons of 
the Eagle. 
25 Harris, “China’s Relations with the Latin American and Caribbean Countries,” 154. 
26 R. Evan Ellis, “The U.S. Military in Support of Strategic Objectives in Latin America and the 
Caribbean,” Prism 8, no. 1 (February 19, 2019): 37. 
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2. Drug Trafficking in Latin America 
Even though illegal drug trade is a dilemma in many parts of the world, the literature 
reviewed here focuses on the character of drug trafficking in Latin America. Because of its 
proximity to the United States, drug trafficking in this region is of greater interest to 
American politicians and citizens. Drugs trafficked across national borders in the western 
hemisphere are typically cocaine, methamphetamines, fentanyl, and heroin.27 
The only thing almost every scholar agrees on within this literature is that drug 
trafficking is a problem. Professor Menno Vellinga’s extensive research states that the 
prevalence of drug production in certain Latin American regions indicates the instability 
of the socio-economic infrastructure–peasants need an income and politicians are 
susceptible to bribes.28 Dr. Bruce Bagley and Dr. Jonathan Rosen conclude that the 
demand for drugs in the United States and Western Europe indicates a health and social 
crisis caused by both the side effects of addiction and the political means used to try to 
disincentivize consumption.29 The transit routes between suppliers and consumers indicate 
a potential border control issue that is not limited to the United States-Mexico border.30 
The first source of disagreement in the literature is whether or not to classify drug 
trafficking as a security problem. U.S. policy has been to categorize it as an issue of 
national security since President Nixon. Nixon declared a “war on drugs” and established 
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 1973 to organize the national effort to 
 
27 David Vergun, “U.S., Mexico Cooperate to Reduce Cross-Border Drug Flow,” DOD News, 
November 6, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2408588/us-mexico-cooperate-
to-reduce-cross-border-drug-flow/; and Drug Trafficking Violence in Mexico: Implications for the United 
States before the U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of 
Kevin L. Perkins, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, and Anthony P. Placido, Assistant 
Administrator for Intelligence Drug Enforcement Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation). 
28 Menno Vellinga, ed., The Political Economy of the Drug Industry: Latin America and the 
International System (Gainsville: University Press of Florida, 2004). Many of Dr. Vellinga’s collaborators 
suggest that the problem with the drug economy in Latin America is that it fills a void in state-sponsored 
projects to improve infrastructure in remote regions. 
29 Bruce M. Bagley and Jonathan D. Rosen, Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime, and Violence in the 
Americas Today (Gainsville: University of Florida, 2015), 418, https://muse.jhu.edu/book/39885. 
30 Jorge I. Domínguez and Rafael Fernández de Castro, eds., Contemporary U.S. - Latin American 
Relations (New York: Routledge, 2010), 37–38. 
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address the problems of drug use.31 In 1982 President Reagan affirmed that drug 
trafficking remained a national security priority and further militarized the United States’ 
efforts to combat it.32  
After the 9/11 attacks, the war on terror replaced the war on drugs as the primary 
national security focus. Professor Jorge Domínguez and others point out that most of 
American foreign policy was securitized after the attacks, which is how Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and al-Qaeda are both designated terrorist 
organizations.33 The war on drugs may no longer be the primary focus of national security, 
but counter-narcotics remains one of the primary roles for SOUTHCOM. In 2015 
SOUTHCOM Commander General John Kelly reported that narcoterrorism was 
responsible for 40,000 deaths per year since 9/11. While he acknowledged that this threat 
is not exclusively military, he insisted the lethal impact of drugs equated a security 
concern.34 Campaign Martillo, a multinational operation targeting drug trafficking, has 
been ongoing since 2012, the same year General Kelly assumed command of 
SOUTHCOM.35  
While military leadership and national leaders consider drug trafficking to be a 
security issue, others argue that the securitization of drug trafficking misses the heart of 
the problem. Bruce Bagley is one of many who argue that the militarization of the United 
States’ response to drugs has exacerbated the problem.36 Instead, drug abuse, and the 
consequential demand for drug trafficking, should be considered a health, social, and/or 
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economic problem. A nuance of this position is presented by multiple contributors in 
Menno Vellinga’s The Political Economy of the Drug Industry. Professor Francisco 
Thoumi and Dr. Ivelaw Griffith both report that drug cultivation and trade have been means 
to break poverty cycles in multiple states in the region. Cartels introduced societal order 
outside of government authority, undermining the government’s legitimacy and taking 
control of remote regions.37 If the demand for drugs indicates a health crisis and the supply 
of drugs indicates socio-economic weakness, the solution to the problem is not going to be 
in the realm of national security. 
The second major area of divergence is how to address the problem. The divisions 
in this literature are two-fold. The first division depends on whether or not an author 
considers drug trafficking a security or non-security issue, and the second on how to 
address supply and demand for drugs. Leaders and scholars who consider drug trafficking 
primarily as a security issue continue to emphasize the importance of military operations 
like Campaign Martillo and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), a joint agency 
effort providing law enforcement training to Caribbean states.38 Outside police, politicians, 
and judiciaries, there is a small group of academics who still consider drug trafficking a 
security issue. Among them is Paul Stares, who published an article in 1996 when he was 
the director of research for the United States Institute of Peace to caution against 
academia’s calls to desecuritize the national response to drug trafficking.39 His caution 
about desecuritizing the drug crisis was had more to do with the logistics of changing long-
standing policy rather than an analysis of the drug trade itself. The lack of current academic 
work identifying the drug crisis as a security issue with a military or law enforcement 
solution is a significant gap both in the literature and between academia and public policy. 
The scholars who do not consider drug trafficking as a security issue offer an 
alternative. The first step is to decriminalize or legalize the use of drugs. Decriminalization 
does not legalize drugs, rather it turns drug possession into something comparable to a 
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39 Paul Stares, “Drug Legalization? Time for a Real Debate,” Brookings Review, Spring 1996, 
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/drug-legalization-time-for-a-real-debate/. 
11 
traffic violation instead of a felony. This does not eradicate black-market trade, legalization 
would allow for regulation and taxation of drugs while decriminalization would reduce the 
social cost of prosecuting drug offenses, and reframe drug abuse into a health problem 
rather than a law enforcement one.40 Scholars like Dr. Bagley and organizations like the 
Human Rights Watch point to Europe as an example where multiple countries have 
decriminalized and/or legalized drugs and then used funds to support health treatment for 
the addicted and rural development for source countries.41 Investing in rural development 
in drug sourcing countries is critical according to Peruvian sociologist Mariano Valderrama 
and economist Hugo Cabieses because rural peasants, not the drug cartels, are negatively 
affected by current policy.42 There is a much stronger scholarly voice supporting the idea 
that drug production is symptomatic of larger problems like education, health, socio-
political infrastructure, or weak economies, which are on both the supply and demand side 
of the drug economy.43 Drug trafficking and drug consumption are similarly considered 
indicative of socio-economic problems. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
There are two possible answers to the question of whether or not drug interdiction 
operations in the Western Hemisphere support GPC objectives. First, it is possible that 
military drug operations do not support a GPC centric national security strategy. The would 
be the case if the campaigns, training, and education that are part of the overall military 
endeavor do not result in either maintaining or strengthening American influence as the 
partner of choice in Latin America. If this is the case, SOUTHCOM may need to reevaluate 
how it conducts and funds operations, especially due to the close integration of the 
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Departments of State and Homeland Security (DHS) with the Department of Defense 
(DOD) in its drug trafficking role. 
Second, it is possible that the goals of GPC are achieved through military drug 
interdiction operations in the SOUTHCOM AOR. During the Cold War, SOUTHCOM 
focused on the defense of the Panama Canal and contingency operations for the possibility 
of war with communist powers.44 When the Cold War ended, SOUTHCOM reorganized 
itself around counter-drug operations, and it has spent the past 30 years developing a 
concept of joint and international operations that addresses drug trafficking, responding to 
natural disasters, and supporting infrastructure projects. The military has played an integral 
role in these operations and built relationships with partner militaries. Today 
SOUTHCOM’s mission is oriented around building partner capacity. Cooperation in 
reducing drug trafficking has been a primary means of building other navies’ capacities 
and developing military relationships that balance against perceived growth in Russian and 
Chinese influence.45 Additionally, the overt investment of American military resources in 
a hemispheric problem is a tangible indication to Latin American and Caribbean states that 
the United States is both invested in regional security and wants to be the “partner of 
choice” for these nations.46 Being the partner of choice for Latin America effectively 
prevents Russia and China from gaining a greater foothold in the Western Hemisphere, 
which is an essential part of American GPC strategy. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research is designed as a comparative case study of the relationship between 
GPC and U.S. maritime counternarcotics efforts in three countries: Colombia, Mexico, and 
Jamaica. These states are not compared with each other, instead this thesis compares the 
goals of national security policy with the outcome of military missions in specific 
geographic areas in order to analyze how counternarcotics operations might support or 
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undermine American policy goals of GPC. The three selected case studies come from 
different Latin American subregions, have connections to drug trafficking, and are 
countries which receive Chinese and/or Russian investment. Colombia is leading producer 
of drugs as well as a primary partner in SOUTHCOM’s maritime anti-drug efforts. 
Mexico’s importance in this study is due to its role as home base to cartels involved in drug 
trafficking and its geographic location on the United States’ southern border. Jamaica is 
relevant to this study because illegal drug trafficking is a significant part of its economy 
and a major transit point for drugs going to the United States and Europe. China maintains 
numerous investment projects while illegally fishing in poorly policed Caribbean territorial 
waters. Drug interdiction operations occur in the sea lanes between these countries and 
especially along the Central American isthmus. The comparison between these regions is 
intended to determine if and where GPC strategy would have the most significant impact. 
In order to explain the historical context of my question, my research first examines 
how GPC influences U.S. relations with Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica. After examining 
the impact of GPC, my research identified each states’ priorities and determined if and how 
U.S. drug policy was a shared priority. Where a similar emphasis is placed on 
counternarcotics, U.S. interdiction operations help achieve GPC objectives. Where the 
priorities are different, U.S. policy makers need to assess if a continued emphasis on drug 
trafficking will impede the accomplishment of GPC goals. 
This thesis does not include an assessment of the overall efficacy of drug 
interdiction operations. Recognizing that these military operations are part of a larger 
regional effort, my analysis is restricted to the indirect effects of military participation in 
drug trafficking on GPC. The controversy around the efficacy of drug trafficking efforts is 
not a factor in my research by may impact follow-on research.  
Ultimately, considering where GPC priorities and counternarcotics operations 
conflict or complement each other is essential to efficiently allocating resources to 
accomplish both national security goals. By qualitatively analyzing the demands of GPC 
and maritime drug operations, this research concludes that the current use of naval assets 
in SOUTHCOM for drug operations also support the overarching concerns of GPC if 
partner nations place a similar priority on counter-drug policy. 
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis includes four chapters. After this introduction, Chapter II focuses on 
GPC, including an historical analysis of how GPC affected Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica 
during the Cold War and how GPC powers are currently pursuing their strategy in these 
countries. Chapter III is organized by country and provides an analysis of how Colombian, 
Mexican, and Jamaican national priorities and compares them to U.S. goals. Chapter IV 
assesses how GPC objectives and maritime drug operations intersect and provide policy 
recommendations for SOUTHCOM’s use of military capabilities.  
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II. MODERN GREAT POWER COMPETITION IN LATIN 
AMERICA 
This chapter analyzes the rise of modern great power competition (GPC) and sets 
the historical context for understanding how U.S. military drug interdiction operations 
support U.S. national security objectives in outpacing competitors in Latin America. The 
first section covers a brief general history of modern GPC. The second part examines GPC 
case studies in Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica through the Cold War. The final section 
looks at the renewed emphasis on GPC in the United States, China, and Russia. It discusses 
the transitions in U.S. policy focus in Latin America after the Cold War and reviews the 
rise of China and Russia as great powers with a competitive interest in Latin America. 
A. THE RISE OF MODERN GREAT POWER COMPETITION 
Great power competition today has its origin in the nineteenth century when 
European empires, having conquered and divided most of the known world, competed with 
each other for supremacy. Until the world wars these great powers rarely engaged in overt 
military conflict.47 Leading up to World War I, these powers preferred to use statecraft, 
diplomacy, and economic treaties to achieve political ends and firmly establish nation-state 
identities. Liberal ideals and convictions about the inevitable progress of humanity 
convinced many Europeans that all-out war would be relegated to history even though 
military actions and encounters in colonies and frontier lands were frequent, bloody, and 
brutal.  
Before the World Wars, the military and physical conflict between great powers 
took place in the periphery of great powers, usually in colonial territory.48 The World Wars 
shifted the military conflict to the center of great power administration in Europe, but the 
location of physical conflict in GPC moved back to the periphery after 1945. Two major 
changes occurred in the nature of GPC after the World Wars: a shift in the number of actors 
and a change in motivation. Historically, GPC usually took place in a multilateral 
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environment and focused on control of materials.49 The first change was the shift from a 
multilateral political arena to a bilateral one. The United States and the USSR emerged at 
the end of World War II in more powerful positions than their allies, resulting in a bipolar 
international arena. The second change in modern GPC was great powers’ emphasis on 
ideology over material control. In other words, the United States and USSR continued 
competing for control of good and materials, but successes on both sides were considered 
proof that one ideology was better than the other. Both the United States and the USSR 
wanted to influence the reconstruction of Europe, but they had vastly different visions: the 
United States supported a capitalist framework for the economy and democratic 
governance while the USSR backed the principles of a communist system. As far as these 
bilateral powers were concerned, the Cold War was an ideological conflict they fought in 
an economic arena.50 
The United States and the USSR never fought outright, but tension between them 
boiled over in other locations. In the 1960s and 1970s, the geographic center of gravity for 
conflict shifted to the Third World. Proxy wars in Southeast Asia, Latin America, Africa, 
and the Middle East cost thousands of lives as states were pressured to pick a side. The 
question of state survival in these areas was exacerbated by the conflict between the United 
States and the USSR because their ideological conflict failed to directly translate into the 
Third World countries.51 Leaders in these areas were not always ideological zealots, but 
often “political actors that [were] more than happy to exchange military assistance for pro 
forma loyalty.”52 Especially in Latin America, local interests received minimal 
consideration, and leaders had to cater to either U.S. or Soviet policy. Tensions in Latin 
America resulted in a significant drain of financial resources to the USSR and political 
outcomes that damaged the United States’ credibility. Among many important lessons of 
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the Cold War, not least should be the recognition that the stakes in diplomatic conflict are 
far more complex but just as destabilizing as military conflict. 
B. GPC IN LATIN AMERICA DURING THE COLD WAR 
American policy in Latin America went through three phases between 1800–1990. 
The first phase was driven by the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary, the second 
by the Good Neighbor Policy, and the third by the Cold War. In the first phase, the Monroe 
Doctrine marked the Western Hemisphere as off limits to European imperial expansion. 
The Roosevelt Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine justified U.S. intervention in the 
Caribbean when European governments began using force to collect debts. Interventionism 
maintained some support as an effective policy, but it “also led to a firestorm of criticism 
from many who saw the U.S. presence as an unwarranted intrusion into the domestic affairs 
of sovereign nation-states.”53 
The second era was guided by the Good Neighbor Policy developed by Presidents 
Hoover and Roosevelt where the United States formally adopted a noninterventionist 
policy for hemispheric relations. The Good Neighbor Policy could not prevent every 
intervention, but it significantly decreased the frequency of United States intervention in 
Latin America. 
During the third era, Cold War policy included the establishment of the OAS in 
1948 and the Alliance for Progress under President Kennedy, and U.S. policy toward Latin 
America mostly combined neglect and an anticommunist agenda. Some nations were 
wholly ignored, and some were courted by the Soviet Union and pressured to take a side. 
Neither power was particularly invested in the growth of Latin America outside its impact 
on their rival. The following sections review the overall impact of U.S. Cold War policy in 
Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica. 
 




Colombia aligned itself closely with the United States during the Cold War but 
attempted to establish economic connections with the USSR to diversify its export markets. 
The Soviet Union purchased Colombian coffee and invested in a hydroelectric plant in Alto 
Sinú.54 Nevertheless, Colombia typically supported the United States in international and 
regional issues, sending troops to Korea and supporting Cuba’s expulsion from the OAS 
in 1962.  
Domestically, significant guerilla violence prevented Colombia’s democratic 
institutions from expanding out to rural regions that lacked government presence. The 
FARC, responsible for most of the guerrilla violence, controlled a substantial percent of 
the rural areas in Colombia and received financial support from the Soviet Union in the 
1970s until it expanded its involvement in drug trafficking to establish financial 
independence.55 Formally organized in 1964, the FARC’s opposition to the Colombian 
government had its origins in protests beginning in the 1940s and 1950s. Peasants 
organized themselves into self-defense groups and protested their marginalization and 
inequality in socio-political life. The FARC began as a leftist, Marxist guerilla insurgency 
who acted to undermine Colombian government in Bogotá.56 After the peasant groups 
consolidated into one organization, FARC maintained a regime of terror, using kidnappings 
and violence to prove the government’s incapacity. 
Even though the official government in Colombia failed to establish control of rural 
areas, its democratic institutions maintained stability and economic growth through the 
latter half of the twentieth century. The stability of the government and democratic 
institutions in urban areas encouraged the United States to support the official Colombian 
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government. Because pressure from the United States stunted Soviet influence on the 
official government, and because income from drug trafficking made the FARC financially 
independent from Soviet support, the collapse of the USSR had no significant impact on 
Colombia. 
2. Mexico 
Following Mexican independence from Spain in 1810, Mexico experienced civil 
war, the Mexican-American war, two attempts to establish empires, and eventually a 
restoration of the republic codified in 1857. Eventually, General Porfirio Díaz became 
president, and his 35 years in office were relatively stable but characterized by oligarchic 
rather than democratic policies. After a contested election in 1910, fighting broke out and 
Díaz was pressured to step down. Francisco Madero took power, Díaz went into exile, but 
the fighting did not stop. The ten years after the 1910 election were some of the most 
tumultuous in Mexican history, and a tense relationship with the United States exacerbated 
its bloody civil war.57 
Between Madero’s presidency in 1910 and Álvaro Obregón’s election in 1920, the 
next decade of civil war included eight presidents (elected or interim) and shifting political 
alliances between Mexican leaders. Regional leaders like Obregón, Victoriano Huerta, 
Pancho Villa, Venustiano Carranza, and Emiliano Zapata formed and broke alliances 
frequently. Additionally, U.S. intervention by Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson, the 
occupation of Veracruz by the U.S. Navy in 1914, and U.S. General John Pershing’s 
unsuccessful pursuit of Pancho Villa in 1916 after Villa’s raid on Columbus, New Mexico, 
heightened domestic and international tensions. 
In 1917, Carranza became president and loosely presided over the drafting of a new 
constitution. This update to the 1857 Constitution gave the president dictatorial power and 
the government power to confiscate land, establish workers’ rights, and limit the rights of 
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the Roman Catholic Church.58 Carranza was ousted in 1920, and Obregón was elected. 
Although the revolution ended in 1920, outbursts of violence remained part of the political 
cycle until the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR: National Revolutionary Party)59 
began consolidating power. In 1934 Lázaro Cárdenas took office and began to 
institutionalize the reforms set by the 1917 constitution.60 Cárdenas’ solidified his power 
within his party and gained international attention for nationalizing Mexican oil in 1938. 
Cárdenas’ decision to expropriate Dutch, British, and American oil companies 
followed protests and strikes concerning Mexican workers’ conditions and the money 
flowing out of the country. On one hand, Mexican nationalists were pleased and considered 
the move to be a break from imperialist powers.61 On the other hand, the United States 
boycotted Mexican oil to pressure Mexico to go to international arbitration, rather than 
pursue bilateral arrangements. The onset of World War II, however, redirected American 
attention. When Germany took control of France in 1940, the United States suspended its 
boycott and worked with Mexico to arrange compensation. Meanwhile, Mexico’s oil 
revenue increased after making crude oil deals with Axis powers in 1939. Mexico 
attempted to remain neutral, but Mexico declared war on Germany in 1942 after Germans 
sank two Mexican tankers.  
In the same year, Mexico established diplomatic relations with the USSR. Mexico 
maintained diplomatic ties with the USSR throughout the Cold War, unlike most Latin 
American nations, even though the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI: Institutional 
Revolutionary Party) heavily restricted communist party activities in 1947.62 In 1947, 
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Mexico also signed the Rio Treaty along with 23 other Latin American and Caribbean 
nations. The treaty was concerned with hemispheric defense, and signatories agreed that 
an attack on one of them was an attack against all of them.  
As Cold War tensions escalated between the United States and the USSR, Mexican 
leaders became more interested in being part of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to 
avoid overtly choosing a side. Although Mexico had an observer status in NAM, it but 
never became a full member because of pressure from the United States.  
Mexican leaders resisted U.S. pressure in 1962 during a vote for Cuba’s expulsion 
from the OAS. Mexico not only voted against Cuba’s expulsion but maintained a 
noninterventionist policy in Cuban internal affairs. Mexico was the only nation in the 
Western Hemisphere to continue diplomatic relations and air services to Cuba.63 During 
the Cuban Missile Crisis, however, the Mexican president condemned the Soviet Union for 
positioning missiles in Cuba. 
Another example of U.S. pressure on Mexico concerned the United Nations (UN) 
vote in 1975 on Resolution 3379. The resolution was part of the UN’s attempt to deal with 
the question of Palestine and declared Zionism a form of racism. Mexico attempted to 
distance itself from the United States and supported the resolution. The United States was 
strongly against it while the Soviet Union was for it. In response to Mexico’s vote, the 
United States and other pro-Israel states boycotted Mexican tourism resulting in a loss of 
millions of dollars. Caught between great powers, Mexico voted with the United States or 
abstained in every following vote on Zionism or Israel.64 Mexico’s geographic proximity 
to the United States ensured both that the Soviet Union was interested in undermining U.S. 
hegemony and that the United States would have a decided interest in Mexican 
international relations.  
By the end of the Cold War, Mexico had become the United States’ third largest 
trading partner. The collapse of the Soviet Union alleviated a degree of international 
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pressure on Mexico because the threat to the United States’ position as the regional 
hegemon had disappeared. 
3. Jamaica 
The Caribbean’s colonial history is tightly woven with GPC. Post-independence 
and during the Cold War, some Caribbean states like Cuba were at the forefront of the 
conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Others like Jamaica were 
pressured to pick a side in order to receive investments or aid. As European states 
relinquished the remainders of their empires following World War II, the United States and 
the Soviet Union kept watchful eyes on the region. 
Jamaica was conquered first by Spain and then by Britain, and it remained under 
British control until 1962 when it was granted independence after a 17-year transition, 
remaining a member of the Commonwealth. During the transition to independence, 
Jamaica experienced unrest from pockets of labor-movement leaders and trade unionists. 
Several members were identified as “potential future dictators,”65 and Britain formed a 
strategy to ensure that an independent Jamaica would not be susceptible to communism. 
One tactic to contain communism involved restricting the movement of pro-communist 
activists. Local leaders in Jamaica were influenced by the McCarthyism coming out of the 
United States, and communist literature was suppressed alongside a counter-propaganda 
campaign. According to one analysis of Jamaica in the Cold War, the neuroticism of the 
British and American governments concerning the supposed vulnerability of new nations 
to communism, regardless of popular sentiment, added tension to its independence 
process.66  
Following independence in July 1962, Jamaica joined the United Nations in 
September. Jamaica also joined NAM in 1970 when the Jamaican Labour Party (JLP) was 
elected, hoping to avoid the conflicts in which neighboring regions were embroiled. In 
1972, Michael Manley of the People’s National Party (PNP) attempted to convince the 
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Soviet Union to invest in Jamaica and developed a close relationship with Fidel Castro in 
Cuba, roughly 90 miles north of Jamaica. Although he was not a supporter of Jamaican 
communists, he distrusted United States hegemony.67 Edward Seaga replaced Manley in 
1980, and Seaga was firmly anti-communist and sent troops to support the U.S. invasion 
of Grenada. The fall of the Soviet Union minimally impacted Jamaica due to domestic 
economic troubles from deficit, international debt, and the devastation from Hurricane 
Gilbert in 1989.  
C. GPC RESURGENCE 
This section first discussed the transition of U.S. national security priorities in Latin 
America after the Cold War, beginning with drugs, followed by terrorism, and then a 
transition back to GPC in response to Chinese and Russian policies. The second part 
examines China’s rise as a great power and its interest in Latin America. The final part 
reviews Russian resurgence to great power status and its policy focus in Latin America.  
1. United States 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States had no near-
peer competitors involved in Latin America, and Cuba, the only remaining communist 
state, was a negligible threat now supported by communist China, which was not a concern 
to U.S. leaders at that point. U.S. national security shifted focus to drugs. Drug abuse 
became a focus of domestic policy in 1973 when President Nixon established the Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA). Nixon coined the phrase “war on drugs,” hoping to mobilize 
the national support against drug abuse.68 In 1982 President Reagan affirmed that drug 
trafficking remained a national security priority and further militarized the United States’ 
efforts to combat it.69 Following the launch of Nancy Reagan’s “Just Say No” campaign 
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in 1985, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act in 1986 established drug possession penalties, increased 
drug trafficking penalties, and allocated increased funding for counterdrug efforts.70  
Nine years later, President Clinton also passed the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994 which also increased penalties for possession and distribution.71 
Domestic policy merged with Latin American foreign policy at the end of the Clinton 
administration in 1999 when Colombian President Andrés Pastrana, frustrated by a failed 
attempt at peace negotiation with FARC, submitted Plan Colombia to the United States 
government. His plan requested support to strengthen Colombian infrastructure in order to 
diminish FARC influence. By the time Plan Colombia was ratified by the United States in 
2000, Congress had altered Pastrana’s proposals it to match its own international goals in 
the region. According to Tom Long, “the United States’ redesign of Plan Colombia turned 
it from a peace plan into a battle plan.”72 Needing the foreign investment, Colombia 
adopted the changes and received over $1 billion, $7.7 million of which went to military 
and police aid.73 Álvaro Uribe replaced Pastrana as president, and Plan Colombia became 
a hallmark of both counternarcotics policy and the strength of United States-Colombia 
relations.74 Plan Colombia remained active until 2015. Although the U.S. federal 
government continues to take a punitive approach to the abuse of drugs, some state 
governments began taking a different approach in 1996 with the legalization of medical 
marijuana, followed by recreational marijuana in 2012.  
Drugs would likely have remained a priority, but the 9/11 attacks suddenly shifted 
national security focus to counterterrorism. Even though counter drug policy remained 
important, the war on terrorism replaced the war on drugs. Terms like “narcoterrorism” 
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emerged in discussions to keep counternarcotics efforts relevant to the new national 
security strategy.75 After 2001, Plan Colombia received additional funding. In Mexico, the 
Mérida Initiative was developed in 2007 between the Bush and Calderón administrations, 
emphasizing each nation’s shared responsibility to combat drug trafficking as the industry 
responsible for funding terrorist activity.76 Although not explicitly established to deter 
narcoterrorism, the United States and 12 Caribbean nations approved the Caribbean Basin 
Security Initiative (CBSI) to fund training for security and law enforcement organizations 
to combat drug trafficking.77 Counterterrorism continued to be the primary national 
security focus of the Bush and Obama administrations, but the 2015 National Security 
Strategy elevated a focus on building partner capacity in Latin America and the Middle 
East as well as the American relationship with Asia and the Pacific.78  
With the elevation of building partner capacity and focusing on economic ties, the 
2015 National Security Strategy marked a shift away from a terrorism-centered focus. Part 
of the shift included a return to longer term strategies to account for Chinese and Russian 
long-term goals.79 The 2017 National Security Strategy directly mentions a return to great 
power competition, which was central to the Trump administration strategy. President 
Biden’s interim guidance also set the focus for national security to outpacing every 
challenger to maintain America’s current position in the international community.80 
 
75 Bagley and Rosen, 54, 79–80; and Adrián Bonilla, “U.S. Andean Policy, the Colombian Conflict, 
and Security in Ecuador,” in Addicted to Failure: U.S. Security Policy in Latin America and the Andean 
Region, ed. Brian Loveman (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), 103; and Narco-
Terrorism: International Drug Trafficking and Terrorism - A Dangerous Mix before the Committee on the 
Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Steven W. Casteel, Assistant Administrator for Intelligence 
Drug Enforcement Administration). 
76 Bagley and Rosen, Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime, and Violence in the Americas Today, 55; 
and Clare Ribando Seelke, Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, 2007–2021, CRS Report No. 
IF10578 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2021), 1, https://crsreports.congress.gov/
product/pdf/IF/IF10578. 
77 “Caribbean Basin Security Initiative,” United States Department of State, accessed October 10, 
2020, https://www.state.gov/caribbean-basin-security-initiative/. 
78 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC, 2015), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf. 
79 White House, 4. 
80 White House, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (Washington, DC, March 3, 2021), 23, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.  
26 
Although each administration phrases the challenge differently, the past three presidents have 
acknowledged the need to develop a strategy to maintain a competitive position among great 
powers as nations like China and Russia grow and gain regional and global influence.  
While the United States focused on terrorism from 2001 to 2015, China and Russia 
both experienced significant growth in the early twenty first century. The next sections will 
briefly review how China and Russia expanded and grew into great powers, including how 
those transformations led to each state’s current policies toward Latin America and the 
Caribbean. 
2. China 
When the Soviet Union collapsed, China was attempting to build and expand its 
economy. Under Paramount Leader Jiang Zemin, China increased its FDI in other 
developing nations and continued the previously implemented policies that moved away 
from collectivism. Between 1992 and 2002, China’s GDP increased from $0.6 trillion to $1.5 
trillion.81 Hu Jintao took over after Zemin, and China’s growth remained exponential as 
“managed political reforms”82 introduced aspects of capitalism and decentralization into the 
Chinese economy. As China’s economy grew, it began expanding its investments in other 
developing countries, hoping to provide its own model for growth as an alternative to western 
democracy.  
In 2004, China became a permanent observer member of the OAS in order to 
“actively promote its cooperation with the OAS so as to realize common development,”83 
according to Chinese Ambassador Yang Jiechi. Common development, according to China’s 
model, included expanding economic and diplomatic relationships in Latin America. 
Developing military ties with other nations to create space for Chinese investment in military 
infrastructure played a role in consolidating these new economic and diplomatic ties. In 2008 
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China published its intended strategy to expand military ties with Latin America as a result 
of the deepening relationships.84 Xi Jinping continued to encourage the expansion of China’s 
global economic ties when he became the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party 
in 2012. A year later he published his strategy to reestablish a sinocentric trade network in 
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Although BRI does not include Latin America in its plan, 
BRI reflects China’s global strategy, and Latin American resources are of significant interest 
to China.85 
Although Latin America is not an explicit part of the BRI, the region holds significant 
potential as a supplier of raw materials, a location to assemble manufactured goods, and a 
source of energy.86 Chinese economic strategy depends on subregional assets, and its 
diplomatic strategy is influenced by its goal of isolating Taiwan and establishing influence 
in a geographic region near the United States.87 
3. Russia 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian president Boris Yeltsin ran for 
and won reelection in 1991. He attempted to decommunize the economy through shock 
therapy, but the reforms were ineffective and caused a collapse later that year. Yeltsin also 
attempted to decentralize the Russian government and allowed local governments to “take 
as much sovereignty as [they could] swallow.”88 Chechnya, a province on the border of 
Georgia declared independence in 1991. In 1994, Yeltsin directed the Russian army to invade 
Chechnya, but the army was beaten by guerrilla forces in 1996. Many Russians held Yeltsin 
responsible for the army’s defeat and blamed him for the death of over 100,000 Russians in 
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Chechnya.89 The final blow to Yeltsin’s administration was a second economic collapse due 
to an Asian market failure in 1998. In 1999, Yeltsin stepped down and named Vladimir Putin, 
an unknown political figure at the time, as his replacement.  
After winning election in 2000, Putin’s three stated goals were to recentralize 
political control, rebuild Russia’s economy, and restore national pride in Russia.90 In terms 
of recentralizing political authority in Moscow, Putin was able to capitalize on terrorist 
activity in Chechnya and multiple revolutions in various former-Soviet states between 2003 
and 2009. He considered most of the revolutions to be western sponsored efforts to 
undermine pro-Russian and communist governments, and he responded to these events by 
retaking control of various institutions. Economically, Putin’s government benefitted from 
high oil prices between 2000–2019 and an economic boom before the global financial crisis 
in 2008. Putin was also successful in merging czarist and Soviet Russian culture to help 
rebuild Russian citizens’ self-perception, eventually reminding the international community 
of Russia’s resurgence by hosting major events like the Olympics in 2014 and the World 
Cup in 2018.91 Russia’s position as a military power and potential threat was solidified when 
Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 and annexed Crimea in 2014 in response to NATO signaling 
that both Georgia and Ukraine were candidates for joining the organization.92  
Russia’s resurgence as a great power is due largely to its increased economic 
prosperity and international activity in opposition to the United States. Russia backed the 
Syrian leader Assad’s regime in 2011 because it determined the rebels were backed by 
western powers, indicating Russia’s intention to “stand up to what it sees as western 
democracy promotion as a subversion of sovereignty abroad.”93 While Russia’s primary 
focus in international relations is in Asia and Eastern Europe, Russian foreign policy has 
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been invested in Latin America since the early years of the Federation, becoming a 
permanent observer of the OAS in 1992.  
Current Russian policy currently divides Latin America into three subcategories: 
former Soviet allies, nations willing to work with Russia to undermine U.S. influence, and 
neutral states of commercial interest to Russia.94 The Russian military is also interested in 
building relationship with Latin American nations in order to expand military ties and 
industrial military complex and pressure the United States in its own geographic region. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Latin America has historically been a competing ground for great powers, beginning 
with the establishment of colonies. Great power policy toward Latin American nations has 
historically been concerned with how these powers could benefit from the myriad resources 
in the region. The view of Latin America as a pawn between powers is evident in the way 
the United States and the Soviet Union approached diplomacy in Colombia, Mexico, and 
Jamaica. A regional reluctance to firmly ally with either side is evidenced by the multitude 
of states in Latin America that joined NAM. The pressure many nations felt from the United 
States and USSR plays a role in current tensions and some states’ hesitation to unilaterally 
side with the United States (or other great powers), fearing an incursion on the national right 
to self-determination. 
The recent shifts in language in U.S. foreign policy to discuss shared responsibility 
and build partner capacity reflect at least a philosophical recognition of the importance of 
viewing other nations as partners rather than pawns in the international community. Military 
organizations like SOUTHCOM now have as a stated mission to work with other nations in 
such a way that establishes the United States as a partner of choice in the region. Becoming 
the partner of choice of any nation requires great powers to consider the priorities of that 
nation and consider how their priorities overlap. The following chapter will conduct a case 
study of Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica to determine their national priorities and where (or 
if) U.S. security goals overlap with them. 
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III. UNDERSTANDING NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND GREAT 
POWER COMPETITION 
The previous chapter provided an historical understanding of the Colombian, 
Mexican, and Jamaican relationship to great powers and GPC. This chapter identifies their 
national security priorities. Because I am limited by language, I used official statements, 
news articles, academic articles, and data analysis reports to determine what the top two or 
three national priorities are for each case study. Typically, this aligns with the policy 
priorities of the elected head of state, but where popular priorities are noticeably different, 
I address those. 
Following the discussion of each state’s priorities, I review U.S. policy for and 
SOUTHCOM operations with that nation in order to determine if the mission being 
conducted supports the United States’ objective of becoming the partner of choice in the 
Western Hemisphere in support of our overarching national security strategy. Becoming a 
nation’s partner of choice does not necessarily prevent diplomatic or economic relationship 
with U.S. competitors, but it solidifies the United States’ soft power and influence, which 
must be maintained in order for the United States to meets its goals for GPC. 
A. COLOMBIA 
Colombia is an important regional ally to the United States. Colombia generally 
aligned itself with the United States during the Cold War, and the United States is one of 
Colombia’s primary foreign investors, evidenced by the development of Plan Colombia in 
2000. While U.S. perception of Colombia is stereotypically limited to its production of 
drugs, Colombia security priorities are more diverse. Colombia’s security priorities are 
implementing and maintaining the FARC peace deal, stopping anti-government protests, 
and navigating its tense relationship with Venezuela. Following a review of these priorities, 
I will examine Colombia’s relationship with current great powers.  
1. Internal Peace – The FARC Peace Deal 
Colombia is considered one of the region’s most firmly established democracies, 
even though the nation spent the greater part of six decades in a civil war between the 
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official government and FARC. At the height of its influence in 2002, FARC controlled 
almost 16 percent of the nation’s territory in regions where the official government had 
minimal or no presence.95 In 2016 after four years of negotiations, an historic peace deal 
was reached between the government and FARC. The Colombian people voted to ratify 
the deal in October 2016 by slim margin after it was previously rejected by a similarly thin 
margin.96 Iván Duque was elected in 2018, and his party ran the campaign encouraging 
Colombians to reject the peace deal. One of his election platforms was to modify the peace 
deal, and the modifications he promised his voters added uncertainty to the transition 
process. 
Two of the compromises Duque’s government have been most reluctant to 
implement are allowing former FARC members a role in government and the cessation of 
aerial fumigation of coca fields. In the case of FARC’s political participation, the 
International Crisis Group determined in 2018 that this was the most unpopular 
compromise, and that it failed to generate any significant public support.97 However, the 
negotiators agreed on this compromise, requiring some reparations and minimal sentencing 
for FARC leaders who would enter government. Colombian courts have been slow in 
implementing the transitional justice measures for FARC, so its inclusion in government 
continues to be a subject of debate. By contrast, the Duque administration quickly resumed 
aerial fumigation since coming to office.  
Although the president objected to stopping the aerial fumigation of coca crops, 
this tenant of the peace deal generated wide public support. Aerial fumigation was effective 
at eradicating coca plants but destroyed legal crops in the process. Human rights activists 
were also concerned with health side effects of pesticides. Stopping fumigation, combined 
with proposed land reforms and investment in rural infrastructure, was part of the plan to 
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address the socio-economic heart of coca cultivation. Poor or non-existent rural 
infrastructure is makes it hard for peasant farmers to participate in the legal economy 
because farming and transportation costs are inhibitive. Coca cultivation and processing is 
cheap and easy. After the peace deal was signed, the government implemented a crop 
substitution program, subsidizing farmers who voluntarily gave up coca cultivation and 
guaranteeing them land rights after five years.98 However, Duque, already in favor of the 
fumigation method, found himself under some pressure from the United States. Colombia 
was at risk of decertification for what the Trump administration considered “inadequate 
cooperation on counternarcotics,”99 so Duque resumed fumigation rather than risk U.S. 
funding being cut. 
With the ratification of the peace deal and the end of a 60-year civil war, issues that 
were previously of secondary focus gained new importance.100 While maintaining peace 
and preventing former FARC members regrouping remains important, the Colombian 
people have shifted their focus from wanting peace to wanting socio-economic reform. The 
ongoing Colombian protests, discussed in the following section, are a result of the change 
in popular priorities. 
2. Anti-Government Protests 
A second national priority for Colombia concerns the causes of the mass protests 
that first broke out in November 2019. Protestors demanded the Duque government address 
problems in education, welfare, and healthcare.101 Socio-economic problems like 
inequality, education, infrastructure, humanitarian causes are now more central issues. The 
outbreak of COVID-19 further highlighted these social problems because of the shortage 
of supplies like oxygen and protective gear. Colombia also tasked nearly 60,000 police and 
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soldiers with enforcing lockdown in March 2020.102 Protests stopped during the height of 
the pandemic, but the frustrations that led to them were intensified by economic struggles, 
especially in isolated areas.103 
Protests broke out again in April 2021 after the Duque administration proposed a 
tax reform to lower the taxable income threshold.104 Facing significant pressure, the 
government rescinded the proposal, but protests continued. Some protests became violent, 
and law enforcement and security forces were mobilized to control them, but some of those 
encounters were deadly. By early June, over 50 protestors were killed in encounters with 
police.105 Organizations like Inter-American Commission on Human Rights are 
increasingly critical of the Colombian government for failing to prevent unnecessary use 
of force.106 Police violence joined taxation and inequality as causes of the ongoing 
protests. 
Colombia will elect a new president in 2022. The ongoing internal unrest will likely 
force the next administration to reckon more with domestic issues, which are impacted by 
another of Colombia’s national priorities: Venezuela. 
3. Relations with Venezuela 
Colombia shares a border with Venezuela, and Venezuela’s crumbling socio-
political environment concerns Colombian leaders because millions of Venezuelans are 
fleeing to Colombia. While the Colombian people in border cities have been sympathetic 
to migrants and refugees, the mass movement of people into Colombia presents its 
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challenges. President Duque is anti-Maduro, and he and his party recognize Juan Guaidó 
as Venezuela’s president. Duque’s voice is one of the loudest in condemning Maduro, and 
frequently reminds people that the international community agrees with him. In an 
interview with the Council on Foreign Relations in 2020, Duque pointed out that 50 nations 
and OAS recognize Guaidó as the legitimate head of government.107  
Beyond simple political disagreement with Maduro, the chaos in Venezuela affects 
Colombia primarily through mass migration out of the country–almost 40 percent of the 
4.5 million people who left the country are going to Colombia.108 Duque demonstrated his 
interest in assisting Venezuelans and announce in February 2021 that Venezuelan migrants 
and refugees would be given temporary protection status.109 The protection status will last 
for 10 years, and all Venezuelans currently in the country became eligible for some 
healthcare and COVID-19 vaccines. The government’s choice to support migrants and 
refugees is considered by some a humanitarian necessity. Others, however, categorize this 
policy as a diversion of resources, placing additional stress on the current state of unrest. 
4. Colombia and the United States 
The United States considers Colombia a critical partner in the region, and similarly, 
Colombia relies on U.S. investment, especially in its security sector. According to the 
Congressional Research Service, the Departments of State and Defense allocated over $10 
billion in aid with congressional approval between fiscal years 2000–2016.110 Colombia 
and the United States frequently conduct training exchanges, and both nations regularly 
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participate in annual regional security exercises like UNITAS (maritime exercise), Fuerzas 
Comando (special operations skills competition), and Tradewinds (natural disaster 
response). According to R. Evan Ellis, the close ties between Colombia and the United 
States make Colombia avoid purchasing military and law enforcement equipment from 
U.S. competitors like China and Russia. However, Colombia accepts anywhere from $1 
million to $7 million of equipment donations from China every year.111 It is unlikely that 
Colombia will jeopardize its relationship with the United States by forming closer military 
ties with China. However, Colombia is forming stronger economic ties with China with 
the goal of diversifying its investors. 
Colombia’s political and macroeconomic stability make it an appealing investment 
and trade partner for other nations, and China is taking advantage of the opportunity. 
President Duque also made a point of visiting China within the first year of his 
administration.112 Increased FDI is a good thing for the Colombian economy, but China is 
facing criticism for poor business practices relating to working conditions.113 By 
comparison, businesses receiving U.S. investments undergo annual review to prevent 
human rights violations. While this is a good business practice, the price of integrity is the 
limitation of investment opportunities outside security.114 While China invests in 
infrastructure, the majority of U.S. investment is still in security.  
President Duque has one more year in office, but it is unlikely that the national 
priorities will change when the administration does. However, social infrastructure seems 
to be a more serious concern to Colombia. The United States should consider shifting some 
of its investments from hard security through military training to supporting investments 
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in rural infrastructure. This kind of investment would more effectively address the issues 
that directly lead to coca growth and cultivation. U.S. investment in hard security has been 
beneficial in developing close ties with the Colombian military, but in the middle of high 
domestic tensions and accusations of human rights abuses at the hands of security and law 
enforcement, continued investment primarily in hard security does not necessarily assist 
the United States in supporting one of its most significant partners in Latin America. 
B. MEXICO
As neighbors, Mexico and the United States are also closely connected on economic
issues in addition to security ones. Geographic proximity and shared interests, however, 
have not necessarily facilitated an easy economic or security relationship between Mexico 
and the United States, due in part to shared history and in part to personality conflicts of 
leaders. Much of the United States tends to view its relationship with Mexico in terms of 
immigration and drug trafficking. This paper does not discuss immigration, but one reason 
there is a focus on drug trafficking is that the U.S. Customs and Border Protection reported 
84% of the drugs apprehended entering the United States between 2018 and June 2021 
entered through Mexico.115 For Mexico, the border represents many things, but the drugs 
and migrants flowing out of Mexico are less important than the violence caused by drug 
cartels. In order for the United States to effectively maintain and improve its security and 
economic relationship with Mexico, policy makers need to understand Mexican national 
priorities. 
Mexican national priorities are closely tied to the current President of Mexico, 
Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). He was elected in December 2018, and he built 
both his party and platform around the idea of bringing Mexico through a national 
transformation, establishing Mexico’s energy independence, and addressing cartel 
violence.116 This section examines AMLO’s vision for the Fourth Transformation, his 
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energy policy, and his stated objectives for reducing violence in Mexico. After reviewing 
Mexican national priorities, this section reviews where Mexican and U.S. leaders have 
identified compatible security priorities and evaluate if SOUTHCOM’s counternarcotics 
missions support those objectives and the greater goals of U.S. national security. 
1. Fourth Transformation
AMLO’s vision for Mexico is summed up by what he called the Fourth 
Transformation. By numbering it the “fourth,” AMLO couched his campaign and 
administration within previous periods of reform in Mexican history: independence from 
Spain, the Reform period, and the Mexican Revolution.117 This fourth period is intended 
to peacefully bring to fruition the changes the revolution attempted, but never realized: 
peace, equality, and prosperity. AMLO founded his current party, Movimiento 
Regeneración Nacional (Morena – National Regeneration Movement), out of frustration 
with cronyism in AMLO’s former party, the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD). 
His campaign targeted independent voters and ran on a platform of anti-corruption, 
promises to address inequality and economic growth, and emphasis on strengthening local 
rule of law.118 In 2018 AMLO won the election against the incumbent party, and Morena 
won a majority the upper and lower houses of the Mexican Congress.  
The Fourth Transformation was an effective campaign slogan, but since taking 
office, AMLO’s meaning of the Fourth Transformation remains vague. No single policy 
summarizes the Fourth Transformation, but AMLO pushed several projects he was certain 
would both fight poverty, help the economy, and assert Mexican sovereignty: the Mayan 
Train, the Mexico City airport, and the Dos Bocas oil refinery. This section touches on the 
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Mayan Train and the Mexico City airport, and the next section discusses the Dos Bocas oil 
refinery. 
The Mayan Train is a project designed to facilitate tourist access to communities 
and destinations on the Yucatán Peninsula and to connect these smaller communities to the 
larger economy. According to the American University International Law Review, the 
plans for the Mayan Train are likely going to result in the violation of indigenous people’s 
rights for a failure to consult them under the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples.119 Besides this, the train has low public support, the plans do not account for the 
potential environmental damage in a region with endangered species, the project will cost 
more than the projected $6.5 billion, and multiple companies have suggested that AMLO’s 
timeline for completion of the train is not enough time to do it safely.120 Construction 
began in 2018, and AMLO insists that the rail will be complete before his term expires. 
Multiple presidents attempted to begin construction on a newer, larger international 
airport in Mexico City since the current Benito Juárez International Airport is the busiest 
airport in Latin America. Construction of a single larger airport began in Texcoco in 2014 
under AMLO’s predecessor, but AMLO halted construction of the airport in 2018 in favor 
of expanding the military airfield in Santa Lucía. Although the Texcoco field was roughly 
30 percent complete, AMLO calculated that halting construction at Texcoco and expanding 
the Santa Lucía airbase in the name a fiscal austerity. Redirecting construction efforts 
would cost less than $5 billion and save billions. His plan was to expand an existing airfield 
that would work in conjunction with two other airports in the Mexico City area.121 An 
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independent audit, however, recently determined that halting construction at Texcoco will 
cost Mexico over $16 billion.122 The principal auditor agreed to reaudit the cost of the halt 
after AMLO insisted that $16 billion was an exaggeration. Construction continues at Santa 
Lucía and, like the Mayan Train, AMLO is determined that construction will be done 
before he leaves office.  
Besides starting the infrastructure projects of the Fourth Transformation, AMLO 
tried early on to fulfill his campaign promises to show he was addressing political 
corruption and cronyism, as well as income inequalities. He disbanded the 8,000-member 
guard unit tasked with presidential security to reduce spending and show he was 
approachable. He also put the presidential jet up for sale, promising to fly commercial when 
he travels internationally for the same reasons. However, AMLO made fewer international 
visits in the first two and half years of his tenure than both of the previous presidents made 
in their first six months in office.123 In fact, his first international visit was in July 2020 to 
the United States to meet with former President Trump concerning the United States-
Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). AMLO’s decision to sell the plane (although no 
one has purchased it) was gesture to demonstrate his commitment to break away from 
previous administrations’ excesses, but it also reflects his idea that good foreign policy is 
good domestic policy. The Fourth Transformation’s focus is entirely domestic, centered on 
the development of infrastructure with the goal of fighting poverty. AMLO’s intentions 
and ideas, have not had the desired results. 
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Since AMLO took office, the Mexican economy has shrunk, and violence has 
increased.124 During Mexico’s midterm elections in June 2021, Morena lost control of the 
lower congress, its two-thirds majority, and the mayoral race in Mexico City.125 Halfway 
through his term, AMLO’s Fourth Transformation has produced no clearly positive results. 
In spite of AMLO’s lack of tangible progress and loss of congressional control, former 
Ambassador to Mexico Earl Anthony Wayne anticipates that AMLO’s final three years 
as president will likely be similar to the first three.126 AMLO will continue to emphasis 
his vague and poorly defined Fourth Transformation policy and only partially completing 
the projects he started. 
2. Energy 
Energy security—specifically energy independence—is one of AMLO’s primary 
focuses. Contributors at Brookings Institute assessed after AMLO’s first year in office that 
he wants his efforts to bolster Mexican oil to be the hallmark of his presidency.127 First, 
AMLO renationalized Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex), the state-owned company that 
controls oil production. Pemex has been a symbol of Mexican nationalism since the 1930s, 
but the previous administration opened the company to private investors because oil 
production was on the decline. This decision brought in much needed capital and increased 
Pemex’s productivity. According to Samantha Gross, a fellow and director of the Energy 
Security and Climate Initiative, the introduction of competition lowered energy costs for 
Mexicans, enabled efficient replacement of aging oil and power infrastructure, and 
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contributed to the Mexican economy.128 Motivated by an interest in insulating Mexico 
from the volatility of the international energy market, AMLO returned Pemex to a state-
run structure.  
In addition to renationalizing Pemex, AMLO ordered construction of the Dos Bocas 
oil refinery. The Dos Bocas refinery, located in AMLO’s home state Tabasco, was funded 
by the Bank of China and is projected to begin refining in 2022.129 Mexico has several 
other refineries, all of which are scheduled to be upgraded by the end of AMLO’s term. As 
infrastructure projects, these play a role in AMLO’s Fourth Transformation, but the 
upgrades, construction, and acquisition of the majority share of Deer Park refinery in 
Houston, Texas, in 2021 are all part of AMLO’s drive toward Mexican energy 
independence and an affirmation of Mexican sovereignty. 
While AMLO orients Mexican energy around oil, he does so at the expense of 
developing renewables. When Pemex was renationalized, AMLO suspended open 
auctions that allowed for new capital investment, even from domestic actors, to support 
research and development in alternate and renewable energy. Gross expressed 
disappointment because of Mexico’s potential renewable energy development and 
because AMLO’s movement away from renewables will cost Mexicans and place them 
at a disadvantage while alternate technology develops elsewhere.130 Besides the lost 
opportunities in research and development of renewables, the international community’s 
increasing interest in reducing carbon emissions has caused AMLO’s policies to come 
under some scrutiny. 
AMLO’s position on energy as a matter of national sovereignty was recently 
reflected in his expressed resentment of the international community, especially the United 
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States, trying to pressure Mexican energy policy. Before a meeting between the Mexican 
Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard, Economy Minister Tatiana Clouthier, and U.S. Secretary 
of State Anthony Blinken, AMLO stated that Mexican energy was an issue of sovereignty 
and that United States should not try to get involved.131 The Biden administration is 
reemphasizing a commitment to renewable energy and combatting climate change and 
hopes to influence partners to do the same.  
3. Violence 
One of AMLO’s other stated goals upon election was to reduce violent crimes, 
specifically shrinking the homicide rate from 20 to four per 100,000 deaths by 2021.132 A 
year after taking office, however, the homicide rate increased by nearly three percent, and 
almost 1000 more people were killed in 2019 than in 2018.133 Similarly, according to 
research done by Justice in Mexico, the recent midterm elections were exceptionally 
violent: “the 2020–2021 campaign cycle saw the second-highest number of politically-
linked homicides ever, with this latest election only falling behind the 2018 electoral 
process in which 152 politically-active individuals were murdered. The total number of 
910 acts of political violence, however, represented a 17.5% increase over the 774 incidents 
recorded in the 2018 election.”134  
In spite of the increase in violence, AMLO continues to have a policy of “hugs, not 
bullets” and is reluctance to meet violence with force. AMLO is an advocate for addressing 
the economic and social pressures that make young people more likely to join cartel and 
criminal organizations. He implemented several education and employment programs for 
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youth between 18–29 who are out of school and unemployed.135 The emphasis on 
socioeconomic factors rather than hard security strategies is not a new approach, but 
AMLO found it was insufficient. AMLO initially rejected the use of the kingpin strategy 
to counter cartel violence, targeting leaders or high value members. However, after 
unsuccessful attempts to reform the police system, AMLO reverted to a kingpin 
strategy.136 He authorized the establishment of a civilian-controlled National Guard which 
he intended to use against cartels, but much of the force was deployed to the Guatemala 
border in order to help control migrant traffic.137 Like his energy strategy, AMLO’s 
security strategy is unlikely to change during his last three years in office. While AMLO 
reluctantly allows the use of force against violence, Mexican citizens are killed by gangs 
or caught in the crossfires of fighting cartels.  
4. Mexico and the United States 
Mexican and U.S. leaders meet frequently to determine combined strategies on 
mutual issues. On June 8, 2021, AMLO met with President Biden to discuss the bilateral 
relationship between Mexico and the United States. Out of that meeting, the two presidents 
established seven mutual priorities. First, the presidents agreed to hold a High-Level 
Economic Dialogue in September 2021 to discuss the U.S.-Mexico trade relationship and 
infrastructure to support cooperation and collaboration. Mexico’s largest trade partner is 
the United States, while Mexico is second to Canada for the United States. Second, both 
leaders agreed to have a cabinet-level discussion about security and countering 
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) that disregard national borders. According to 
the statement released by the White House following their meeting, “the United States and 
Mexico are committed to working together to reduce homicides and drug-related deaths on 
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both sides of the border and counter the illicit forces that drive them.”138 Third, the United 
States agreed to increase its investment in technical assistance as Mexico implements new 
labor legislation. Fourth, both nations agreed to collaborate on addressing the root causes 
of migration from Central America. Fifth, Mexican and U.S. law enforcement agencies 
will continue to cooperate in countering human trafficking and combatting human rights 
abuses by smuggling rings. Central to this is the promise of continued information sharing. 
Sixth, in support of strengthening Mexico’s southern border, the U.S. government 
developed grants and loans to incentivize growth in the southern states of Mexico with the 
intent of addressing income inequality. The focus of these financial investments is to 
support housing efforts and strengthening eco-tourism and the cacao and coffee industries. 
Finally, in addition to cooperating on CN and human trafficking, the United States 
promised to support Mexico’s effort to investigate the significant number of missing 
persons and disappearances that have resulted from cartel violence.139 Former U.S. 
Ambassador Wayne described the nature of mutual priorities between Mexico and the 
United States as an indication that the relationship between the nations has become 
“intermestic.” 140 In other words, the mutual interests between Mexico and the United 
States cannot be categorized as only international or domestic policy, but as something in 
between. 
Although the U.S. military groups Mexico in U.S. Northern Command’s 
(NORTHCOM) AOR, another indication of its unique position in U.S. policy, the Mexican 
military often conducts joint exercises with SOUTHCOM like Tradewinds and UNITAS. 
While Mexico represents a unique portion of U.S. foreign policy, the United States remains 
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Mexico’s most important partner in the international community.141 It is unlikely that other 
great powers will replace the United States as Mexico’s primary partner, but according to 
NORTHCOM Commander, General VanHerck, China’s presence in Mexico is continually 
increasing in the economic sector and spilling over into the security sector.142 Arturo 
Sarukhan, formerly the Ambassador to the United States from Mexico, wrote about his 
concerns with China’s increasing competitiveness and recommended an emphasis on 
multilateral trade agreements like the USMCA and possibly re-engaging with the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) to 
“provide the template for a much more realistic discussion of how Mexico, with the United 
States and Canada, needs to think of strategic relationships and economic competitiveness 
vis-à-vis China.”143 Counterdrug and law enforcement operations are the primary ways 
the Mexican and U.S. militaries cooperate, and while the discussion of the efficacy of those 
operations is a separate topic, the scope of U.S. military operations with Mexico is 
appropriate for the stated priorities of the Mexican government. 
C. JAMAICA 
Jamaica is positioned at the crossroads of maritime traffic, and Jamaica’s economy 
is primarily built on services: tourism and finance.144 Because of the national reliance on 
these services, Jamaica has been struggling through the impact of COVID-19. 
Strengthening and developing the Jamaican economy has been Prime Minister Andrew 
Holness’ main priority since his election in 2016, and the challenges of COVID-19 have 
increased his determination to achieve economic success. In addition to the economy, both 
Holness and the opposition party are interested in developing Jamaican security strategy 
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with respect to drug trafficking and disturbing levels of violence. This section will provide 
an overview of two of Jamaica’s national priorities, economic growth and reducing 
violence, followed by a discussion of Jamaica’s relationship with great powers. 
1. Economic Development  
The Jamaican economy only recently began recovering from failed socialist 
policies in the 1970s.145 After decades of being unable to diminish national debt through 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs, Jamaica succeeded in 2013 in conducting 
economic reforms that enabled the government to buy public debt.146 According to 
economist Robert Looney, the government’s purchase of debt, while risky because it 
diverted funds from public spending, proved to potential investors that Jamaica was 
committed to creating a stable macroeconomic environment.147 Although Holness was not 
the head of government when the agreement was made with IMF, he continued with the 
IMF’s program to Jamaica’s success.  
Holness was–and remains–committed to economic development. In a 2019 address 
to the UN General Assembly on the topic of multilateral efforts for poverty eradication, 
education, climate action, and inclusion, his opening remarks included that his plan to 
support these goals was by pursuing policy that would lead to a more robust economy. He 
said, “Our major goals are the promotion of inclusive sustainable growth, economic 
opportunities, peaceful society, social harmony and citizen security.”148 Holness 
reaffirmed his commitment to economic development a year later during his swearing-in 
speech after the 2020 elections in which his party won reelection. He made 10 promises to 
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the country, six of which were overtly related to bolstering the economy.149 In his 
communication to international partners, fellow leaders, and Jamaica, Holness is 
committed to economic growth as Jamaica’s first priority. 
2. Security 
In Jamaica, the two main targets of security policies are drug trafficking and 
violence. Due in part to its geographic position, Jamaica is a transit point for many illicit 
drugs. According to Professor Bruce Bagley, “the ‘partial victories’ [in counter drug 
trafficking] in Colombia and in reinforcing the border with Mexico had unintended 
consequences for the Caribbean,”150 meaning that nations like Jamaica became more 
important locations along smuggling routes. Jamaica is one of the largest sources of illegal 
marijuana in the United States and Canada, and data from apprehended cocaine shipments 
indicates that it is an important transit point between Colombia and the United States and 
Europe.151 In the 2019 address to the UN previously mentioned, Holness acknowledged 
that the drug trafficking and resulting crime problem in Jamaica was at a level that required 
international assistance.152 Jamaica receives international assistance from the United 
States through the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) by training local law 
enforcement and assisting with equipment.153 Regional cooperation through the 
CARICOM also plays a role in Jamaican security, which has been effective in deterring 
some illegal activity. 
Jamaica manages its external security with partner assistance, but internally 
Jamaican law enforcement is less effective at deterring violence. The Caribbean is one of 
 
149 Andrew Holness, “The Most Hon Andrew Holness Swearing in Speech” (speech, Kingston, 
September 7, 2020), https://opm.gov.jm/speech/the-most-hon-andrew-holness-swearing-in-speech-
september-7-2020/. 
150 Bagley and Rosen, Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime, and Violence in the Americas Today, 295. 
151 “Jamaica Remains Major Source of Illegal Drugs to U.S.,” Jamaica Observer, April 1, 2019, 
https://www.jamaicaobserver.com/latestnews/Jamaica_major_source_of_illegal_drugs_to_US. 
152 Holness, “Policy Statement by the Prime Minister of Jamaica, The Most Honourable Andrew 
Holness, ON, MP.” 
153 Matthew R. Conners, “Caribbean and Eastern Pacific Maritime Security: Regional Cooperation in 
Bridge and Insular States” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2019), 70, https://calhoun.nps.edu/
handle/10945/58287. 
49 
the most violent regions in the world, and Jamaica has the highest number of homicides in 
the region. As drug traffickers shifted their routes to transit through the region when the 
United States placed pressure on Colombia and Mexico to combat trafficking, island 
nations like Jamaica experienced an increase of gang-related violence. In addition to 
cocaine smuggling, some gangs began participating in weapons-for-marijuana smuggling 
with other Caribbean nations.154 Jamaica’s homicide rate in 2020 was the highest in Latin 
American and the Caribbean—46.5 homicides per 100,000 deaths, with the next country 
at 45.6.155 Under Holness, the primary tactic to reduce violence has been to establish 
special zones of operations in especially rough areas. These zones were placed under 
emergency powers, and law enforcement personnel may detain people indefinitely. Over 
100 people were murdered in Jamaica by February 2021, and Holness requested Parliament 
to continue to recognize the state of emergency. His long-term goal is to continue to build 
a prosperous economy that elbows out the profitability of illicit activity and continue 
programs that create community connections with the police force.  
3. Jamaica and the United States 
Jamaica relies heavily on foreign investment to remain competitive in the global 
economy. It has fewer resources available for diplomacy, and so considers foreign policy 
an extension of economic policy. Consequently, the center of Jamaica’s foreign policy is 
economic growth. The end of the Cold resulted in less direct focus on Caribbean countries 
by the United States, who then chose to interact with the region as a smaller part of the 
Latin American community since there was no longer a Soviet threat to U.S. hegemony.156 
The imbalance of importance in the relationship between Jamaica and the United States is 
reflected by the fact that the United States remains Jamaica’s primary trading partner, but 
the United States’ primary involvement in Jamaica is through CBSI, rather than directly 
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investing in Jamaica. Over $670 million has been invested into CBSI in the past decade, 
and the bulk of the funding was split between development assistance, international 
narcotics control and law enforcement, and foreign military financing, with roughly 44% 
of the budget going toward narcotics control.157 SOUTHCOM’s CBSI Technical 
Assistance Field Team (TAFT) plays a practical role by supporting the material readiness 
of Caribbean maritime law enforcement. TAFT conducts and trains on maintenance, 
logistics, and upkeep of patrol boats. While CBSI has been the primary means of U.S. 
investment in Jamaica, in 2018 the Growth in the Americas Initiative was established to 
encourage investment in energy infrastructure in Jamaica and several other Central and 
South American countries.  
Jamaica’s economic growth goals include attracting private investors beyond the 
United States and the United Kingdom. Jamaica and other Caribbean nations are expanding 
their relationships with nations like China, who Holness call a “non-traditional partner.”158 
China’s investment in Jamaica has been increasing since 2013 when a Chinese company 
funded and led construction on the North South Highway in Jamaica. In 2016 China 
purchased a Russian aluminum mining company located in Jamaica, further solidifying 
economic ties with the country. Jamaica formalized its economic relationship with China 
by signing a memorandum of understanding under BRI in 2019. Although China’s 
investments are increasing, according to a 2020 U.S. State Department report on 
investments, China accounts for 6.4% of Jamaica’s FDI compared to 31.7% from the 
United States.159 The United States will likely remain Jamaica’s primary investor, but 
China’s importance is increasing. 
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In determining whether or not drug trafficking operations support the goals of great 
power competition and the United States’ overall national security strategy, I base my 
assessment on the principle that GPC objectives are met when a nation maintains more 
influence than its competitors. Influence is gained by not interfering with another nation’s 
sovereignty and supporting its national security or economic objectives. These objectives 
were determined through analysis of government statements, news articles, and academic 
journals. This section summarizes the national goals of Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica 
and discusses their current relationship with the United States. These nations were chosen 
in part because they come from different subregions in Latin America, but none of the case 
studies are wholly representative of their subregions. The next chapter will assess if 
military counter drug operations are an effective way of gaining or maintaining influence 
and provide recommendations for adjusting military operations based on overlapping 
priorities between the United States and the nations assessed in my case studies. 
1. Colombia 
Colombia’s national priorities can be summarized as social infrastructure and 
mitigating popular unrest. Counternarcotics policy in Colombia is largely U.S.-driven; and 
because the United States is willing to invest money in supply-side tactics to prevent 
cocaine entering the country, Colombian leaders are willing to develop policy eliminating 
coca plants quickly rather than addressing the larger issues around coca cultivation. Drug 
trafficking and cocaine production are problems for Colombia because of the social issues 
that come with trafficking and illicit economies. Nevertheless, coca cultivation should be 
understood as symptomatic of a lack of rural infrastructure—like navigable roads—and an 
absence of official government representation in rural areas. 
Duque’s decision to resume aerial fumigation of coca crops is an instance of policy 
motivated by U.S. investment. The issue is not that an investor had influence on how 
money was spent, but that aerial fumigation is not the kind of solution that has positive 
long-term results in reducing the amount of cocaine coming out of Colombia. It is also in 
direct opposition to Colombia’s peace deal agreements with FARC. 
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Military involvement in CN operations is a visible way to partner with the 
Colombian military, but the efficacy of involving the U.S. military or using defense 
spending in efforts to eradicate coca plants should be evaluated against Colombian national 
priorities. In Colombia’s case, CN operations may support some U.S. interests, but they do 
not support the maintenance of U.S. influence in the way that meets GPC objectives.  
2. Mexico 
In Mexico, AMLO personally drives the national priorities, and they are centered 
on his vision of Mexican sovereignty. His vaguely defined Fourth Transformation policy 
includes significant and highly visible infrastructure projects touted as solutions in fighting 
poverty. Expanding Pemex and taking steps toward Mexican energy independence is also 
a primary goal for AMLO’s administration. The resources devoted to infrastructure and 
energy leave minimal bandwidth for addressing the violence that characterizes many 
places. Political violence is rampant, as demonstrated by Mexico’s midterm elections, and 
so is violence motivated by gangs or cartels. AMLO’s popular appeal was built on political 
promises to make policies that would generate wealth and peace. Halfway through is term, 
AMLO’s policies have yet to create wealth or peace. 
AMLO has demonstrated he is unwilling to cooperate with the United States if he 
determined it would diminish Mexican sovereignty. Nevertheless, the White House 
statement after the bilateral meeting between AMLO and President Biden in June 2021 
summarized the areas in which AMLO seems willing to cooperate with the United States, 
which included working together to reduce drug-related crime. The most successful 
strategy for Mexican law enforcement has focused on attempting to break up cartels, and 
the United States should continue to support these operations. While AMLO remains 
sensitive to the idea of U.S. influence on Mexican policy, it will be difficult to partner with 
Mexico in a way that meaningfully achieves GPC objectives. 
3. Jamaica 
Economic growth, security, and foreign policy are tightly connected in Jamaica. 
Jamaican leadership has requested international support in addressing trafficking. Regional 
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cooperation through CARICOM is effective and strengthens partnerships between 
Caribbean nations. The United States invests in Caribbean security—and by extension, 
Jamaican security—through CBSI. SOUTHCOM conducts training and supports 
equipment maintenance through its Technical Assistance Field Team (TAFT). CBSI and 
the TAFT under SOUTHCOM have improved Jamaica’s ability to patrol its territorial 
waters and prevent some traffickers from bringing drugs to shore. This means if a smuggler 
is not apprehended in the open ocean by U.S. or coalition forces, Jamaica’s defense forces 
are capable of intercepting smugglers on shared intelligence. Military engagement through 
training continues to be an effective way to build rapport with nations like Jamaica, and 
the United States should continue to invest in the strategy to support its GPC goal of being 
the partner of choice. 
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IV. CONCLUSION: THE INFLUENCE OF DRUG INTERDICTION
OPERATIONS ON GREAT POWER COMPETITION 
This thesis thus far reviewed the history of GPC in and identified the national 
priorities for three countries that are Latin American partners of the United States, and this 
chapter discusses the findings. In attempting to measure the impact of counterdrug 
operations on the United States GPC objectives, I defined becoming—or remaining—the 
partner of choice as achieving that objective. If U.S. policy facilitates or strengthens its 
position as a preferential partner, then that policy is effective for the purposes of this 
analysis. By taking into consideration the priorities of partner nations, the United States is 
more likely to come up with bilateral or multilateral policy that consolidates U.S. influence. 
A. GREAT POWER COMPETITION AND DRUG TRAFFICKING
           In the first Chapter, I discussed the academic work on GPC and drug trafficking. 
GPC is not a new phenomenon, but the United States had no near peer competitors for 
nearly three decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union. China and Russia are now both 
economic and military competitors with the United States. The most recent literature 
attempts to take lessons from the Cold War and apply principles to navigating foreign and 
military policy to retain influence. The literature on drug trafficking acknowledges the 
societal problems that accompany it, but the literature is divided on the efficacy of 
counterdrug trafficking efforts and policy. Couching my research in these two academic 
discussions, I evaluated the impact of U.S. counter-drug trafficking efforts on GPC goals 
by comparing U.S. priorities with the national priorities of Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica. 
The nature of GPC is that every policy decision or military action has an impact on the 
influence a great power maintains. This research shows that drug policy and counter-drug 
operations can positively or negatively impact the United States’ GPC objectives. 
In the second chapter, this thesis analyzed the history of GPC in three case studies 
in order to show how the Colombian, Mexican, and Jamaican governments navigated the 
Cold War. This both provided historical context for the national priorities discussed in the 
third chapter and established a precedent for how each government might behave in the 
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current GPC environment. China and Russia have become great powers, and they have a 
competitive interest in Latin American and the Caribbean. The United States’ historical 
approach to Latin America has been to have a general policy—like the Monroe Doctrine 
or Good Neighbor Policy—and interact thought organizations like the OAS. Great powers 
tend to develop policy and relationships with other great powers in mind. This tendency 
has the potential to treat other nations as pawns, which does not help create a relationship 
where a potential partner has agency. Where agency—or sovereignty—is not supported, 
the United States is a partner by necessity, not the partner of choice.  
The third chapter identified the national priorities for each of my case studies and 
summarized their relationship with the United States. In conducting these case studies, this 
thesis determined that drugs and drug trafficking were at different levels of priority in 
Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica. For Colombia drug production is a factor of larger issues 
like the peace deal and rural isolation from the central that need to be resolved. The 
situation is similar in Mexico, where policy makers consider drug trafficking to be 
symptomatic of poverty. To put it another way, the lack of access to the legal market and 
stable income drives many people into the illegal market. In Jamaica, the high levels of 
violence are tied to drug trafficking, but government leaders. While Jamaica is open to 
assistance in counter-drug trafficking, most of its aid from the United States is indirect 
through CBSI or through CARICOM arrangements. Of these three case studies, only 
Jamaica, with whom the United States deals most indirectly, is the nation that places drug 
trafficking on a similar level of importance. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Tailored policy 
The variation in national priorities between the three case studies indicated that 
blanket regional policies are not as likely to be as effective as tailored policy agreements 
between the United States and individual nations. U.S. decision makers need to identify 
the priorities of partner nations because it provides information for developing mutually 
beneficial policy, facilitates cooperation, and establishes a sense of equality between the 
United States and its partners. 
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U.S. policy in Latin America since the 1970s has been influenced by war on drugs 
rhetoric, whether addressing growth and production or trafficking across borders, and the 
U.S. military has played a significant role in the application of counter-drug policy. In the 
SOUTHCOM AOR, drugs drive the primary security threat to the United States in the form 
of narcotrafficking or narcoterrorism. The problem of drugs is real, but not the same 
priority to all U.S. partners in Latin America and the Caribbean; however, the United States 
has been able to elevate its importance as the regional hegemon. In organizational and 
bilateral relationships, U.S. priorities almost always take precedence. The United States 
benefits in the short term by exercising this kind of influence, but lessons from the Cold 
War indicate that the heavy hand of the United States in international affairs caused 
resentment. In order to avoid repeating the same mistakes, decision makers need to 
consider where compromise is possible, even if it means that U.S. goals are not 
accomplished through negotiated agreements.  
GPC objectives are met when partner nations are treated as sovereign. A nation’s 
partner of choice is going to be the one that facilitates accomplishing their priorities. China 
and Russia are willing to invest in developing nations in the Western Hemisphere, and the 
diversification of investment is beneficial to those nations. U.S. decision makers need to 
weigh the risk of not achieving all of their policy goals against the risk of growing Chinese 
and Russian influence. 
2. Maintain Training Focus for Military Operations 
In Colombia and Jamaica U.S. military involvement in training has been beneficial 
to building up security capabilities. The frequent execution of multinational training 
exercises also provides regional militaries opportunities to collaborate with each other and 
the United States. Operation Martillo, UNITAS, Fuerzas Comando, and Tradewinds all 
provide opportunities for collaboration and discussion about the training needs of partner 
militaries. SOUTHCOM accomplishes its mission to strengthen partners primarily through 
these regular multinational training missions while emphasizing the protection of human 
rights. The military’s key role in supporting GPC objectives in Latin America is through 
training and education.  
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C. FUTURE STUDIES 
1. Organizational Relationships 
Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica all belong to at least six regional organizations like 
OAS or CELAC. My research focused on bilateral relationships and not how these 
organizations impact GPC. One variable that this study did not consider was the role of 
international organizations in Latin America. Security agreements and regional alliances 
are regularly established. These organizations make general regional policies easier to 
develop than bilateral ones, which I argue is not conducive for meeting GPC objectives 
since it distances the priorities of individual nations from policy that ought to be mutually 
beneficial. Further research could be done to account for the impact of organizational 
relationships to policy or its influence on achieving GPC objectives. 
2. Efficacy of Drug Trafficking Operations 
This research intentionally avoided the discussion of the efficacy of drug 
interdiction operations. The literature on drug trafficking is divided on whether or not 
interdiction helps the combat the domestic drug problem. Drugs are an important domestic 
issue, and drug interdiction operations will continue while drugs remain a political and 
social priority that influences elections. Regardless of efficacy, drug interdiction operations 
are a simple way for militaries to interact, train, and produce quantifiable results in the 
amount of drugs apprehended. Other research could be conducted on alternate military 
operations that have the potential to support GPC objectives. 
3. Alternate Case Studies 
This thesis considered only three nations in a large and diverse region. An alternate 
study could choose case studies from the same subregion, or simply different case studies 
without regard to subregion. 
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D. FINAL THOUGHTS 
In attempting to measure the impact of drug interdiction operations on GPC 
objectives through case studies on Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica, the answer to the 
research question depended how important counter-drug policy was to the partner nation. 
If the United States and its partner placed it on a similar level of priority, GPC objectives 
are likely to be met by cooperating to reach a mutual goal. If there was a significant 
variation in the emphasis placed on combatting drug trade, investing U.S. resources will 
likely be unsuccessful in achieving GPC goals.  
Governments, especially democracies, are obligated to organize national priorities 
in a way that best facilitates their own citizens’ ability to live in freedom. In the United 
States, drug legislation is a domestic issue that impacts elections. Drug policy is also a 
domestic concern that drives foreign policy for the United States. Similarly, domestic 
policy in Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica drives their foreign policy, and it is appropriate 
for them to conduct their international affairs in a way that best suits them. As the regional 
hegemon, the United States has been able to orchestrate many arrangements to its own 
benefit, which is ideal for any government. However, in a GPC environment with an 
interconnected international community, the manner in which the United States achieves 
policy goals may conflict with achieving its strategic objectives. 
The United States should continue to prefer policy that is better for U.S. citizens, 
but only if that policy also meets the nation’s overall strategic objectives. In this case, the 
strategic objective is to become the partner of choice in the Western Hemisphere, thereby 
preventing China and Russia from gaining significant influence. Becoming the partner of 
choice may require more compromising with partner nations. The United States may not 
always get its way, but that may ensure there is a preference for the United States over 
other great powers, achieving strategic success. If the United States is unwilling to allow 
partners the agency to pursue their national interests, policy makers must either learn to 
make appealing arrangements or be willing to run the risk that another great power has a 
better offer. An international system where the United States maintains its position as the 
global hegemon is the best-case scenario for the endurance of freedom and democracy 
around the world.  
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